Discourse ethics is originall y conceived as a programme of philosophical justi cation of morality. This depends on the formal derivatio n of the moral principle (U) from non-moral principles . The moral theory is supposed to fall out of a pragmatic theory of meaning. The original programme plays a central role in Habermas's social theory: the moral theory, if true, provides good evidence for the more general theory of modernization . But neither Habermas nor his followers have succeeded in providing a formal derivation . This essay shows how and why Habermas's proposed derivatio n is impossible. As if aware of the lacuna, Habermas has recently suggested that (U) can be derived by 'abduction ' rather than deduction. The proposal draws heavily on modernization theory; hence the only justi cation for (U) now available to him rests on premises drawn from that theory. The original programme of the justi cation of morality has thus given way to the weaker programme of the philosophica l elucidation of morality. Further, since Habermas's moral theory is no longer justi ed independentl y of modernization theory, but at least partly by it, the moral theory cannot without circularit y provide evidence for the modernizatio n theory.
I. Introduction
One of the features that marks out Habermas's Discourse Ethics from most other contemporary moral theories is the extent to which it is informed by social scienti c research in cognate areas of sociology, anthropology, and psychology. This has meant that from its inception Habermas's conception of morality has been hand in glove with a conception of modernity and with a theory of modernization. The moral theory forms part of a wider social theory. I take it that this is a strength, not just a peculiarity of Discourse Ethics. For much of moral philosophy after Kant, despite Hegelian protestations, has been guilty of neglecting the historical, social, and cultural dimension of the phenomenon of moral normativity it explicates.
As the programme of Discourse Ethics has developed since the early 1980s, so the constellation of moral theory and modernization theory has altered. Originally, Discourse Ethics is conceived as a programme of philosophical justi cation of the moral principle or the moral standpoint of Discourse Ethics and it provides a justi catory support for modernization theory. The trouble is that neither Habermas nor any of his followers has so far managed to provide the formally valid derivation of (U) promised by the original programme. Habermas is aware of this lacuna and has recently proposed a weaker justi cation of principle (U), by abduction, in lieu of its formal-logical deduction (DEA, p. 60). 5 In section III below I show why the proposed formal derivation of (U) cannot be provided. In section IV I argue that the weaker abduction of (U) rests much more rmly on considerations of modernization theory than Habermas is prepared to admit. Finally, in section V, I sketch the upshot of this alteration for the original programme of Discourse Ethics, namely that Habermas must abandon the forlorn task of convincing the moral sceptic and stick to the more feasible one of explicating and con rming the selfunderstanding of moral agents. In turn, this alters the relation of the theory of morality to the theory of modernity: The Discourse Theory of Morality is no longer justi ed independently of modernization theory. Consequently the theory of morality no longer offers justi catory support to modernization theory: it is at least partly justi ed by modernization theory.
II. Modernization Theory and the Programme of Discourse Ethics
(1) I begin by outlining Habermas's theory of modernization and its relation to his moral theory. Habermas develops his concept of modernity through a critical engagement with the concept of rationalization in Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Lukacs, Horkheimer, and Adorno. He narrates a general and plausible story concerning the emergence of secular morality as the historical consequence of a monotheistic Judaeo-Christian tradition whose values and norms presuppose the existence of an objectively good and just way of life. That way of life is recommended by a God who is both the omnipotent creator of an ordered cosmos and the absolutely just and good omniscient saviour of human kind. In this tradition each human being has a dual role, as a member of a religious community of neighbours, and as an individual whose salvation depends on God's judgment. This duality is re ected in two aspects of morality: (i) universal respect for others (and accountability to all others) and (ii) the absoluteness or unconditionalit y of moral requirements.
According to Habermas, two world-historical shifts inaugurate the transition to a modern conception of morality. First, the shattering of this religious tradition and the pluralization of conceptions of value under conditions of multiculturalism result in the separation of the notion of justice from a particular concrete conception of the good -the ethos of the Christian community. Second, the demise of the metaphysical conception of essence and the gradual transferal of epistemic authority to the natural sciences fundamentally alter the meaning of morality. The core conception of morality preserves itself under modern conditions by harnessing the idealized procedure of discourse as a formal standard of impartial justi cation that any valid substantial norm must meet. Thus moral discourse replaces the example of a 'missing "transcendent good" ' (DEA, p. 58).
The story Habermas relates does not describe the singular fate of the Western Occidental tradition, but a more general process of the detachment of forms of normative authority from religious world-views. 6 Habermas pays particular attention to two further tendencies that I have so far omitted to mention: the rise of individual autonomy, or what Hegel calls 'subjective freedom', 7 and the differentiation of spheres of rationality, the increasing 'autonomy' of aesthetic, ethical-legal, and scienti c rationality. 8 The 'modernity' that results from this process presents an ambiguous legacy for modern individuals. On the positive side, their sphere of freedom is greatly increased. The power of the state, once uncoupled from religion and tradition, is held in check by publicly accessible criteria of legitimation, e.g. whether or not its affairs are run in the interests of those who comprise it. Thus modernity presents an opportunity for modern subjects to renew patterns of meaning and social interaction on a basis that promises stability, transparency, and accountability. 9 On the negative side, these increases in subjective freedom and in the accountability of suprasubjective structures of authority are bought at a high price: the social deracination of individual subjects and their increasing vulnerability to the disciplinary effects of impersonal systems of administration and to the vagaries of an ever more powerful capitalist economy. 10 Habermas diagnoses the negative outcome of modernization, the social pathologies of modernity, in the extent to which systems of 'instrumental action' corrode the repository of 'communicative action' in the life-world which is the basis of cultural reproduction, socialization, and social integration, and thus sever at the root the opportunities that modernity presents (TKH2, pp. 449-548/TCA2, pp. 303-74).
Habermas's new approach allows him to correct the one-sided, negative analysis of rationalization which runs through Weber to the Frankfurt School. Habermas's analysis is no longer focused exclusively on the subject qua victim (and also in a sense qua perpetrator) of the ravages of social rationalization. For Habermas, modernity is analysed in terms of the relation between the autonomous systems of money and power -as the embodiments of 'instrumental rationality' -and the life-world -as the embodiment of 'communicative rationality'. This approach makes salient the degree to which discourse -in particular moral discourse -is able to compensate for the demise of religious traditions as a common source of meaning, value, and belief by replenishing the basis of meaning. Thereby discourse discharges the tasks of socialization and social integration, and eases the burden of legitimation that now falls on all aspects of modern forms of life (PNK, p. 226). This, I take it, is the crucial positive implication of Habermas's modernity thesis. 11 In Habermas's theory of modernization the tasks of the stabilization and integration of society fall primarily to practical (i.e. moral) discourse. 12 Under modern conditions 'processes of social integration are increasingly decoupled from apparently natural traditions', whilst on the institutional level 'universal moral principles and procedures of law-making replace traditional values and norms' (PNK, p. 226). Moral discourse can do this because, as a practice that is oriented to reaching consensus it exercises a legitimating function and because, under modern conditions, mass loyalty and social integrity follow legitimacy.
(2) Habermas's thesis that modernity cannot borrow its sources of normativity from the past, but henceforth 'has to create its normativity out of itself' (PDM, p. 7) captures the central idea of his modernization theory. The thesis is familiar to anyone who knows Habermas's work. It forms the basis of the phenomenological analysis of the time-consciousness that Habermas takes to be characteristic of modernity (PDM, pp. 1-44). It is central to his historical analysis of the origins of the modern epoch, and it forms the internal goal towards which the developmental logic of normative social structures unfolds: in post-traditional or post-conventional societies, individual agents judge the validity of established norms, rules, or practices according to selfchosen principles. 13 The liberated subjects, no longer bound and directed by traditional roles, have to create binding obligations by dint of their own communicative efforts. (PNK, p. 231) 14
There is no denying the centrality of the modernity thesis in Habermas's work. But what is the upshot of the thesis for the Discourse Theory of Morality? What makes a conception of morality distinctively modern?
Habermas's conception of morality illustrates the modernity thesis in roughly the following way. Habermas contends that the historical shift from a traditional or pre-modern to a post-traditional or modern conception of morality is accompanied by a fundamental shift from a realist moral and evaluative world-view (Habermas tends to call it a 'metaphysical' worldview) to an idealist (or 'post-metaphysical') moral world-view. Before the onset of modernity, agents supposedly act under the assumption that there is a single objective moral good for man to which true moral utterances correspond and false moral utterances do not. This assumption, according to Habermas, is an illusion, for moral goodness is not an objective part of the fabric of the world. However, the illusion that it is -that it exists independently of moral agents -is effective in coordinating action. Thus the ideal (non-objective) nature of moral goodness is masked by the existence of culturally homogeneous communities with a shared set of 'thick' moral concepts and value conceptions which effectively prevent moral agents from discovering that the moral world depends on their attitudes. However, with the advent of modernity, the illusion of the objectivity of moral goodness is unmasked.
According to Habermas, Kant takes the decisive rst step towards a modern conception of morality. Kant's rst formulation of the categorical imperative locates the source of normativity not in the substantive values embodied in concrete maxims of action but in the criterion of universalizability in virtue of which those maxims are incorporated into the will. Kant's ethics make clear that the legitimacy of moral norms derives from their rational structure not their substantive content. We can call this rst step proceduralism.
However, according to Habermas, Kant mistakenly assumes that the procedure by which moral norms are selected takes place somehow inside each solitary individual. He is blind to the intersubjective or social nature of reason. Unlike Kant, Discourse Ethics locates the rational standards by which moral norms are tested for their validity in the conditions under which speakers and actors can reach intersubjective agreement in discourse about the meaning of their moral utterances. On this point Habermas cites Thomas McCarthy's concise reformulation of his own Kantian position:
Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be a universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for the purposes of discursively testing its claim to universality. The emphasis shifts from what each can will without contradiction to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a universal norm. (MCCA, p. 67 and HCD, p. 257)
We can call this second step intersubjectivism . Thus in Habermas's view, as a result of modernization the validity of moral norms comes to be seen as a procedural, intersubjectively ideal construction, rather than as a real, objective property of actions. Moral utterances do not correspond to a mind-dependent reality, nor need they:
For discourse can, thanks to the normative content of its communicative presuppositions, create out of itself the constraints which are imposed on the practice of justi cation by the projection of a moral universe. (RW, p. 205 my translation) 15 Under modern conditions moral agents come to know that the amenability to 'rationally motivated consensus' in discourse is not just good evidence for, it is constitutive of, the validity of moral norms.
One reason why it is important that Habermas illustrates the modernity thesis with the example of morality is that the modernity thesis is itself a generalization of an originally aesthetic concept. For Habermas is aware that the phenomenon of 'modernity' rst emerges historically in the eighteenth century with 'the process of the detachment from the models of ancient art' (PDM, p. 8). If, as Habermas claims, the process of modernization is a general one, not particular to the history of Occidental Rationalism, then the same process should manifest itself in each of the different spheres of value that modernity spawns. The example of morality shows that the phenomenon is not con ned to the aesthetic sphere. It is thus good evidence for the existence of a general phenomenon that can be the proper object of the theory of modernization. However, it is good evidence only providing that the conception of morality in play is justi ed independently of the theory of modernization. Otherwise the example of morality presupposes what it is supposed to illustrate -a certain conception of modernity.
III. Principle (U) and Programme of Discourse Ethics
Now we can turn to the question of the derivation of the moral principle. The Programme of Discourse Ethics as originally conceived is a programme of the philosophical or 'moral-theoretical justi cation of the moral point of view' (OCCM, p. 347/DEA, p. 59) or 'of the moral principle' (MCCA, p. 78). The central aim of Discourse Ethics is to justify the moral principle (U). A recent formulation of (U) states that:
[A] norm is valid if and only if the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be freely accepted jointly by all concerned. (OCCM, p. 354/DEA, p. 60) (U) is a rule of argumentation that makes agreement possible. According to Habermas's original (1983) conception of Discourse Ethics, (U) is suf ciently justi ed if it can be derived from the following two premises:
(1) the normative (but non-moral) preconditions of argumentation in general. (MCCA 92) 16 (2) a 'weak (i.e. non-moral GF) idea of normative justi cation' or 'the conception of normative justi cation in general as expressed in (D)'. (MCCA 92, 97, 198) 17 Note that the broader question of the justi cation of (U) depends on, but does not consist in, the narrower question of the formal-logical derivation of (U) from just these premises. (The logical derivation of [U] is a suf cient but not a necessary condition of its justi cation.) In his seminal 1983 essay 'Notes on a Programme of Philosophical Justi cation' (MCCA 43-116), Habermas claims that 'the programmatic justi cation of Discourse Ethics requires all of the following: 1. A de nition of a universalization principle that functions as a rule of argumentation. 2. The identi cation of pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation that are inescapable and have a normative content. 3. The explicit statement of that normative content (e.g. in the form of discourse rules). 4. Proof that a relation of material implication holds between steps (3) and (1) in connection with the idea of the justi cation of norms' (MCCA 97).
This justi cation programme of the moral standpoint presupposes a formallogical derivation of (U) from the two above-mentioned premises. A 'material implication', as mentioned in step 4 above, is what is represented by the truthfunctional connective, ' É ' or '® ', meaning roughly, 'if, then'. Strictly speaking nothing is 'derived' merely by standing on the right-hand side of that symbol. 18 What Habermas means by step 4 is that there is a formally valid inference to (U) from premises (1) and (2). So if premises (1) -the necessary pragmatic preconditions or rules of discourse -and (2) -'the conception of normative justi cation in general as expressed in (D)' -are true, then (U) can be derived by modus ponens in the following way. 19 (1) R (rules of discourse) (2) D (discursive conception of justi cation in general) (3) (R and D) (3*) if (R and D), then (U)
This argument is no doubt formally valid. But we need more than formal validity to establish the truth of the conclusion. To do that we have to establish that the argument is sound, so we need to know whether all the premises are true. 20
Premise 1
Habermas thinks that premise (1), the rules, norms, or formal-pragmatic preconditions of discourse can be given a transcendental-pragmatic justi cation. 21 Roughly speaking, the idea is that whenever participants in discourse (who are as such always already oriented toward reaching consensus) assert p, they must, even if only counterfactually, assume that everyone ought to accept p as the result of an ideally prosecuted discourse. The ideality of discourse is preserved by certain implicit norms that are internal to the practice. Habermas does not give an exhaustive list of these implicit rules of discourse, but assumes that any exhaustive list will contain the following four rules:
(a) that nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be excluded; (b) that all participants are afforded equal opportunities for participation; (c) that participants must mean what they say; (d) that communication must be free from internal and external compulsion, so that the yes/no stances that participants adopt towards criticizable validity-claims are motivated solely by the rational force of better reasons. (OCCM, p. 356/DEA, p. 62) 22
Under (b) Habermas includes three further rules which are relevant to the derivation of (U), namely that: (i) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever; (ii) everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatsoever into the discourse; and (iii) everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
The 'transcendental-pragmatic' justi cation of premise (1) would take the form of a maieutic demonstration to the sceptical participant in discourse of the following points: (a ) that he intuitively cannot but make assumptions concerning rules of discourse; (b ) that he can recognize them once they have been identi ed and described; and (c ) that examples can corroborate the discourse ethicist's assertion that there are no alternatives to these assumptions (MCCA, p. 97). The demonstration uses the device of performative self-contradiction to make these rules salient. A performative self-contradiction obtains when a participant implicitly, i.e. by virtue of the performative act of making an utterance, invokes rules which he explicitly, i.e. by the propositional content of his utterance, denies. For example, 'p, but I do not mean p', or to use Moore's famous example, 'it is raining, but I do not believe it'. I am not going to discuss the propriety of this kind of 'transcendental-pragmatic' justi cation. I am content just to report Habermas's position that such a justi cation can be given for the above rules. Let us grant that there is a satisfactory transcendental-justi cation of premise (1), since nothing in my argument below will depend on it. Let us assume further that Habermas's proposed derivation does not depend on rules of discourse which are not contained in the above list from (a) to (d) so that his argument does not trade on hidden premises.
Premise 2
In his essay, 'On the Cognitive Content of Morality', Habermas suggests that 'the normative conception of justi cation' that serves as the second premise is expressed in principle (D) (OCCM, p. 355/DEA, p. 59). (D) states that: only those norms can claim validity that could meet with the acceptance of all concerned in practical discourse. (OCCM, p. 354/DEA, p. 59) 23 Note that (D) speci es a necessary condition, namely that valid or impartially justi ed norms must be amenable to consensus in discourse. It does not state that consensus is also a suf cient condition of validity. (D) does not state that what it is to be valid (or justi ed) is to be thus amenable to consensus. It leaves open the thought that there may be invalid or unjusti ed norms that are amenable to consensus in discourse. But why should we accept (D)?
(D) rests on the pragmatic theory of meaning. Until the late 1990s Habermas claims that an epistemic conception of truth and normative rightness are two speci cations of a single underlying generic conception of validity. He contends, rstly, that meaning can be explicated by its validity basis -namely, by participants' knowledge of the justi ability conditions of utterances; and secondly, that the validity (justi ability) of utterances connects necessarily with their amenability to consensus in ideally prosecuted discourse. 24 Habermas calls the consensus that would arise from an ideally prosecuted discourse a 'rationally motivated consensus'. We can formulate this idea of validity as follows:
For any p: if p is valid, then p is amenable to rationally motivated consensus (r.m.c.)
Two clari cations are required here. First, the 'if then' is not a logical entailment but a pragmatic connection that inheres in our linguistic practices. As for the modal claim in the consequent, it refers to what it would be possible for real participants (not intelligible characters or super-rational beings) to accept as a result of a real (not a hypothetical) discourse, but one which is ideally prosecuted in conformity with the above rules. Now Habermas claims further that there is an analogy between truth and rightness. The analogy is explained by the fact that both of these values are speci cations of the single underlying conception of validity.
For any utterance p: if p is true, then p is amenable to r.m.c.
For any norm n: if n is right, then n is amenable to r.m.c. 25 Now it is easy to see that the latter speci cation of validity as rightness just is principle (D). We can check it against the formulation of (D) previously cited. In this respect the validity-consensus conditional contained in (D) provides a direct analogue in practical discourse with validity claims to truth in theoretical discourse. 26 Premise (2), then, rests on Habermas's pragmatic theory of meaning and on the analogy between truth and rightness. 27 That said, I think that (D) is, when suitably clari ed, intuitively plausible. It amounts to the claim that, if a norm is justi able, then it can be accepted by everyone in an ideally prosecuted discourse. We do not have to buy into the controversial underlying metaethical or linguistic theory before we accept the principle. Let us, for the sake of argument, grant premise (2) as well.
Premise 3
Even if we accept premises (1) and (2) the proposed derivation fails, for premise (3) is clearly false. (U) states that: a norm is valid if and only if the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be freely accepted jointly by all concerned. (OCCM, p. 354) (U) is a biconditional which states that the amenability to consensus on the basis of interests is a necessary and a suf cient condition of the validity of a norm. It is a criterion of validity in the strongest sense in which Wittgenstein used that term. 28 The amenability to consensus is not merely evidence for validity, it constitutes the validity of a norm. Formalizing the argument can help to show what is wrong with it. 29 Let 'n' be a variable ranging over all norms. Predicates 'V', 'C', and 'I' stand for 'is valid/justi ed', 'is amenable to discursive consensus', and 'is amenable to a discursive consensus of interests', respectively.
(1) R premise
The rst problem is that it in no way follows from premises (1) and (2), the rules of discourse, and principle (D), that the amenability to discursive consensus is a suf cient (as well as a necessary) condition of the validity of a norm. Nothing in the rules of discourse warrants this inference. According to the central plank of discourse meta-ethics -namely the alleged analogy between truth and rightness -(D) contains a necessary but not also a suf cient condition of normative validity. If (D) were already a biconditional the situation would be worse. (D) would be the criterion of normative validity. The derivation of (U) would already contain the criterion of normativity -or something very close to it -in premise (2), which would itself then require derivation from non-moral premises. 30 Otherwise the programme of Discourse Ethics would be open to the charge of vicious circularity.
The second problem with the above argument lies in the difference between the indeterminate nature of the consensus, amenability to which is a necessary condition of validity according to (D), and the much richer notion of a consensus of interests, amenability to which is a necessary and suf cient condition of validity according to (U). (U) states that a norm is valid/ justi able (i.e. there is suf cient reason to accept it) if and only if it satis es what Habermas calls a 'universalizable interest'. A further premise is needed that links the suf ciency of reasons with the existence of a universalizable interest in a norm's implementation (and all its foreseeable consequences). In the absence of such a premise, there is a gap between (D) and (U).
One possibility is that the inference to the richer notion of a consensus of interests in (U) is somehow warranted by the rst premise. This may be where rule (b) (iii), 'Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs', comes in. The trouble with (b) (iii) is that, as Habermas himself concedes in the second edition of his 1983 essay, it is 'obviously irrelevant for theoretical discourses'. Despite this, Habermas adds curiously, '[i]t belongs to the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation as such' (MCCA, p. 89 n. 72/ MKH, p. 99 n.71). But if the expression of individual desires and interests has nothing whatsoever to do with the search for truth, why should a rule permitting everyone freely to express their desires and interests count among the rules of discourse or argument in general? If, on the other hand, this rule gures in the premises as a precondition of moral argument or of moral discourse, then the suspicion of circularity is raised again.
William Rehg has suggested that the gap can be closed in the following way. Firstly, he elaborates the meaning of 'norm' as a 'shared behavioural expectation' whose general observance resolves con icts of action 'by regulating the satisfaction of the relevant interests of those involved (in light of a value or values the norm de nes as having priority for all'. 31 Secondly, he adds a further premise, that participants in discourse nd themselves 'in a modern pluralist society beset by con icts of interest whose normative regulation can be convincingly based -should one decide for argued solutions at all -only on direct argumentation over which interest or value is to have priority in situations of a given type'. 32 Rehg sees that 'grounding this assumption falls to a theory of modernity informed by a theory of communicative action'. 33 The trouble is that technically speaking this is not just an assumption which can be discharged: it is a premise on which the argument for (U) rests. Once it is added, the proposed derivation of (U) depends on modernization theory.
For all Rehg's insightful and detailed elaboration of the hidden premises in the formal derivation of (U), he does not show how we can get from the necessary condition of validity in (D) to the biconditional in (U). He does not explain whence comes the requirement in (U) that the amenability to a consensus of interests be also a suf cient condition of validity. And that alone rules out Habermas's claim that a formal derivation of (U) from (1) and (2) can be provided. 34 This does not mean that there is no possible justi cation of (U). It just means that there is no apparent way formally to derive (U) from premises (1) and (2), and that such a derivation should therefore play no part in Habermas's justi cation programme.
IV. Modernization Theory and the Abduction of (U)
Habermas's work of the 1990s exhibits markedly less con dence that a formal derivation of (U) can be provided. Rather than attempt to provide a formal deduction of (U), Habermas is now content to make (U) plausible by adducing genealogical and historical arguments 'resting on assumptions of modernization theory' (OCCM, p. 357/DEA, p. 63). In lieu of a formal derivation, Habermas holds out the prospect of a weaker justi cation which does not depend on the logical derivation of (U). Habermas suggests that (U) follows from (1) and (2) as 'initially just an hypothesis won through abduction' (DEA, p. 60/OCCM, p. 354). This justi cation strategy is weaker because (U) no longer follows by formal-logical entailment, but informally by 'abduction'.
'Abduction' is a term C. S. Peirce used to name the informal process by which inquirers come up with a best guess about which hypothesis to select and to subject to inductive testing. Peirce considers that the process of abduction is not just a matter of luck. It comprises a broad range of rational considerations such as, the purpose of the hypothesis, simplicity, elegance, explanatory scope, and compatibility with other beliefs. 35 In other words, abduction is an inference to the best explanation in which a range of different pragmatic criteria ll out the relevant superlative. Habermas's claim now is that (U) suggests itself as the best explanation of the moral phenomenon in question, namely 'the "ought" character (Sollgeltung) of norms and the claims to validity raised in normrelated (or regulative) speech acts' (MCCA, p. 44).
What makes (U) and the Discourse Theory of Morality the best explanation of the normativity of moral utterances? Habermas mentions two criteria, usefulness and intuitiveness. (U) must prove useful as a rule of moral argumentation in so far as it 'succeeds in selecting norms that are amenable to universal consensus'. Further, it must not lead 'to counterintuitive results' (OCCM, p. 355/DEA, p. 60). The abductively won moral principle must be able to capture our intuitively most certain cases.
But are not the most common objections to principle (U) precisely that it is not useful and that it is deeply counterintuitive? 36 Of course it depends on what is meant by 'useful' and 'intuitive'. It may be that each norm that passes the stringent test of universalization contained in (U) is amenable to universal consensus, even though very few do. Habermas's claim is something like this:
(U) is justi ed if it passes some norms that are universally acceptable and no norms that are not and thus yields no result that is counterintuitive. Now, just about the only valid norms embodying universalizable interests that Habermas adduces with any con dence are 'those that enshrine fundamental human rights' (OCCM, p. 355/DEA, p. 60). But it might be objected that, if only those norms enshrining fundamental human rights can be con dently expected to meet the condition that (U) imposes, then that itself is deeply counterintuitive. For there is a huge discrepancy in scope between everything we intuitively understand under the term 'immorality', e.g. lying, promise breaking, disloyalty, hypocrisy, etc., and what intuitively falls under the concept of human rights violations.
Habermas has a good response to this objection. Moral intuitions are by their nature messy and the intuitive boundaries of morality vague. Any moral principle, whether or not it is based on the ideal of universal agreement, is bound to be selective. It is therefore reasonable to expect such a principle only to justify the central hard core of values and norms, the ones to which we are most deeply committed. It would be unreasonable to expect the norms that principle (U) selects to re ect the whole eld of pre-re ective candidate values and norms. It is enough that (U) is intuitive in the rst sense, that it validates some norms, however few, and that none of the norms it validates is counterintuitive. Further, Habermas claims, it is not a methodological consequence of his moral theory that very few actual norms are capable of eliciting a universal consensus of interests. It is rather an effect of actual social and cultural change that the domain of morality has shrunk to a hard core of universally acceptable hence obligatory norms more or less coextensive with that of universal human rights (JA, p. 91).
The following example may help to illustrate Habermas's point. Earlier last summer there was agreement among a surprisingly wide political spectrum that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was morally justi ed. The moral justi cation of intervention was not the manifest insincerity and duplicity shown by the Serbian regime when negotiating the Rambrouillet accords, it was that intervention seemed to be the only viable means by which to halt the mass expulsions, ethnic cleansing, genocide, rape, and torture being perpetrated by the Serbian militia in Kosovo. The moral norms, the violation of which succeeded in uniting the international political community against the political and economic odds, were in fact none other than those enshrining universal human rights.
It might be thought that this example shows only that, given the paucity of recognized institutions and the lack of enforceable sanctions at the level of international law, human rights violations are sometimes suf cient to justify the engagement of the 'international community' in the internal political affairs of neighbouring countries, but that this shows nothing about the nature of moral norms in general. However, one has to recall that the primary justi cation of the military intervention was a moral and not a political one. 37 No other grounds would have suf ced. The example certainly demonstrates the peculiar ability of the norms governing human rights to elicit very widespread consensus. If Habermas is right that under modern conditions the standpoint of morality is indeed restricted to and preserved by those norms which can still successfully elicit universal agreement, then moral norms indeed become all the more important in their role of coordinating action. The Kosovo example shows this to be true. Thus it undermines the objection that Habermas's whole conception of morality is counterintuitive. Moreover, the objection does not show that (U) fails to meet the criteria of usefulness and intuitiveness in the weaker sense speci ed above, and it is these conditions which the abductive justi cation of (U) brings to bear.
None the less, Habermas's suggested abduction will only serve in lieu of a deduction, if the various criteria which it can show that (U) satis es are jointly suf cient to justify it. His argument -indeed, if I am right it is the only viable argument for (U) -is roughly as follows. (The abbreviations MT, PTM, and MP indicate whether a particular consideration is based on modernization theory, Habermas's pragmatic theory of meaning, or on moral phenomenology.)
(1) If morality is a practice whose function is to regulate con icts of interest between agents in the life-world (MT and MP); (2) if, under modern conditions, con icts are settled by appeal to impartially justi ed norms (MT);
(3) if there is no functional alternative to discourse/argumentation as a means of arriving at impartially justi ed norms and thereby resolving con icts of interest in the life-world (MT and MP); (4) if the existence of the practice of discourse/argumentation in general presupposes idealizing rules of discourse, (a-d) which can be demonstrated to be necessary (i.e. re exively ultimate) through the device of performative self-contradiction (PTM); (5a) if the meaning of the predicates right/wrong, and of moral utterances, depends on their conditions of justi ability (MT and PTM); (5b) if the discursive justi ability of a norm can be elucidated by its necessary pragmatic connection with consensus in discourse as contained in principle (D) (PTM); (6) if interests provide reasons that justify norms (MT and MP); (7) if there exists a number of universalizable interests formed in the light of shared (or shareable) moral intuitions or values (MT and MP); (8) if it can be shown that there is a single rule of argumentation, (U), which is consistent with the rules of discourse and principle (D) (PTM); (9) if (U) can serve as a moral principle (regulating con icts of interest) because (a) it selects some norms and each selected norm is one which every participant in discourse can accept in the light of their interests (MP) and (b) it selects no norms which are inconsistent with our deepest moral intuitions (MP); then (10) (U) is justi ed.
The long conjunction of considerations can be seen as the antecedents in a conditional of the form: if (a & b & c . . .), then U. This captures the hypothetical nature of the argument. Remember that this is not supposed to be a formally valid argument, but an informal abduction or inference to the best explanation that takes the place of the formal derivation of (U) in the original programme of Discourse Ethics. Writing out the argument schematically, as I have done here, makes clear that it rests very heavily on modernization theory. The antecedents (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), and (7) that license the inference to (U) as the best explanation all rest on modernization theory.
It is true that Habermas has not abandoned all hope that a formal derivation of (U), or one that is 'immanent' to the pragmatic theory of meaning, is possible. Indeed it is part of the programme of Discourse Ethics. For Habermas thinks that only a formal or 'immanent' derivation can completely allay the sceptic's suspicion that the rational reconstruction of morality rests on an ethnocentric fallacy (DEA, p. 61). I have argued that a formal derivation of (U) from premises (1) and (2) is not possible. Habermas's recent concessions show that a formal derivation of (U) is no longer even necessary. For in response to Rehg's criticisms, Habermas has conceded that principle (D), or premise (2), is itself partly based on modernization theory.
If the practice of deliberation itself is regarded as the sole possible resource for a standpoint of impartial justi cation of moral questions, then the appeal to moral contents must be replaced by the self-referential appeal to the form of this practice. In other words, it falls to modernization theory to show that the antecedent holds, i.e. that, as moderns, we must seek impartial solutions to problems arising from con icts of interest. In the aftermath of the shattering of religious traditions and comprehensive metaphysical doctrines, there can be no further recourse to a universally shared set of substantial norms and values. Furthermore, modernity theory must show that only the idealized procedure of moral discourse can provide a standpoint from which such con icts can be resolved impartially, because moral discourse contains within it a standard of impartial justi cation that any valid norm must meet, and thus can replace the example of a 'missing "transcendent good" ' (OCCM, p. 353/DEA, p. 58). In this case, principle (D) and the alleged analogy between truth and rightness rest on modernization theory, not the pragmatic theory of meaning and the theory of communication. Consequently, even if (U) were to follow deductively from the conjunction of premises (1) and (2), Habermas's moral theory would still depend in part on modernization theory.
Habermas obviously thinks it much harder for the sceptic to reject 'the neutrality of discourse principle', (D), than the moral principle, (U). That is because (D) follows from the universality of the practice of argumentation, and from the fact that for us modern agents there is no alternative. To reject (D) would thus be to reject two sets of facts, reconstructive facts about the nature of discourse on the one hand, and historical and sociological facts about the role of discourse on the other. The question is, do these facts obtain, and can they be ascertained, independently of modernization theory. If, as I suspect, the answer to this question is 'no', then the sceptic will be able to claim that modernization theory [and thus also principle (D)] is also merely an ethnocentric prejudice. But if (D) is no more immune from sceptical suspicion than (U), there is no need for Habermas to continue to hold out the in my view forlorn hope that a logical derivation of (U) from the conjunction of (1) and (2) can be provided.
V. Conclusion
In section III I showed that there is no formal or 'immanent' derivation of principle (U), the central idea of Habermas's discourse theory of morality, from the premises of discourse theory alone -the rules of discourse and principle (D). In so far as it is justi ed, (U) remains just an 'abduction' or inference to the best explanation, and this inference leans heavily on modernization theory. This bears out my thesis that in the course of its development from the original programme the Discourse Theory of Morality has come to rest heavily on Habermas's theory of modernization.
What is the upshot of this development for the theory of modernization on the one hand and for the Discourse Theory of Morality on the other? Firstly, if my argument is correct, the Discourse Theory of Morality can no longer offer the independent justi catory support to Habermas's modernization theory that the original programme of Discourse Ethics promised. The Discourse Theory of Morality rests very heavily on evidence provided by modernization theory. That the two theories are mutually consistent is therefore no surprise. It is only to be expected.
My claim is not that this fatally damages either Habermas's theory of modernization or his conception of modernity. According to modernization theory, there is a general, underlying pattern of socio-cultural development which has repercussions in each of the different value-spheres that separate out in the course of the development of modernity. Crudely speaking, the modernity thesis is supposed to capture that general phenomenon. If modernization really is a general phenomenon, it should leave its traces in the moral sphere. My point is simply that since Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality rests on modernization theory, it cannot itself be offered as evidence for the truth of that theory. Not that modernization theory depends solely on that evidence; it depends also on a broad range of other considerations historical, legal, aesthetic, scienti c, etc.
Second, what is the upshot for the programme of Discourse Ethics as originally conceived, namely as a programme of justi cation of the moral standpoint? Put starkly I suggest that the Discourse Theory of Morality has not delivered the programme of philosophical justi cation of the moral standpoint that Discourse Ethics initially promised. It is, at best, a programme of the philosophical elucidation of moral normativity.
What is the difference between these two programmes? Well, conceived as a programme of the philosophical elucidation of moral normativity, the Discourse Theory of Morality can no longer take itself to be an answer to the moral sceptic. The question of the moral sceptic is, 'Why be moral?' understood as a demand for justi cation. According to Habermas, the original programme of Discourse Ethics answers in the following way:
(1). Demonstrating to the sceptic through the device of performative contradiction that even he, to the extent that his utterances are meaningful and thus oriented towards reaching agreement, must implicitly recognize the pragmatic presupposition of argumentation.
(2). Formulating the above as rules or implicit norms of discourse.
(3). Showing that, to the extent that the sceptic can justify his utterances (which is assumed as a condition sine qua non of the ability to make meaningful utterances) he has always already recognized the principle of universalization (U). (This is where the logical inference to (U) from premises (1) and (2) comes in. Of course, it must be assumed that the sceptic recognizes the laws of logic.) (4). Challenging the sceptic to live a life without reliance or recourse to communicative action and discourse.
Having outlined this justi cation programme Habermas draws the following conclusion:
If the sceptic has followed the argumentation that has gone on in his presence [(1-3) above GF] and has seen that his demonstrative exit from argumentation and action oriented toward reaching understanding leads to an existential dead end [(4) above GF], he may nally be ready to accept the justi cation of the moral principle that I have introduced. (MCCA, p. 102) However, we have seen that the Discourse Theory of Morality now concedes that both (D) and abduction of (U) rest heavily on modernization theory. And there is no reason the sceptic must accept that theory, even if he is committed, on pain of performatively contradicting his own utterances, to recognize that the rules of discourse are binding on him, too.
Thus to say that the Discourse Theory of Morality is a programme of elucidation is to admit that Habermas cannot avoid presupposing the truth of modernity theory as a premise in his only available argument for (U). Not only that, it is to admit that the programme does not rest on entirely non-moral premises. Both modernization theory and the abduction of (U) presuppose the existence of the moral standpoint. Modernization theory presupposes the existence of a standpoint of impartial justice as the historical bequest of religious tradition. The abduction of (U) presupposes the existence of some valid norms (namely those norms embodying universal human rights) against which the usefulness and intuitiveness of the moral principle (U) can be checked. Thus the justi cation of the moral standpoint proposed by the Discourse Theory of Morality presupposes exactly what the sceptic rejects.
Discourse theory still provides an answer to the question, 'Why be moral?', but in a much weaker sense than before. It aims to elucidate the selfunderstanding of agents who already recognize the normative meaning of moral utterances and the validity of moral norms; the self-understanding, that is, of modern moral agents.
All this by no means implies that the outcome of the programme of Discourse Ethics is trivial. It is not obvious that there is a single principle of the validity of norms that is both useful and able to capture our deepest intuitions about what is morally right. Nor is it by any means obvious that, if there is one, it is (U). If Habermas can show that there is such a principle, and that it is (U), if he can demonstrate that his rational reconstruction of the pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action and discourse is the best available hypothesis for making sense of our current moral practices, then he has accomplished a lot.
To see this one only need consider a very prominent, current line of argument against Habermas's conception of Discourse Ethics. On this popular but defeatist view Habermas should drop the moral-theoretical aspirations of Discourse Ethics, for in the end it fails as a theory of the validity of moral norms, and only succeeds as a theory of the democratic legitimacy of socio-political norms. 38 That such a judgment should be so widespread is testament enough that the Discourse Theory of Morality, understood as a programme of the philosophical elucidation of the moral standpoint, lacks nothing in controversy and ambition. Much potential confusio n is sown because Habermas and his commentators do not signal the distinction between the meta-theoretica l or meta-ethica l justi cation that Discourse Ethics claims to provide, and the rst-order justi ability of norms which, accordin g to Habermas, constitute s the validity of moral norms, i.e the distinctio n between the theoretica l justi cation that Discourse Ethics is, and the moral justi ability which it is about. 2 This does not imply that the moral theory is justi ed on non-normativ e grounds. For the norms of discourse (see below) play a central role in Habermas's pragmatic theory of meaning. 3 Originally Habermas called it a theory of 'practical discourse'. Only after 1988 does he develop the distinction between pragmatic, ethical and moral discourse. But retrospectivel y he realizes that (U) was all along a moral principle at the centre of a moral theory (JA, p. vii). 4 Discourse Ethics, claims Habermas, 'can be built into theories of the developmen t of moral and legal consciousnes s at both the sociocultura l and the ontogeneti c levels and in this way can be made susceptibl e to indirect corroboration ' (MCCA, p. 98). 5 Not that Habermas has abandone d the original programme entirely; he still holds out the hope that a formal derivation can be provided (DEA, p. 61), although he now concedes, in face of the detailed and persuasiv e arguments of William Rehg, that one premise of the proposed deductio n -principle (D) -rests on modernizatio n theory (see section IV). 6 TCA1, pp. 157-216. 7 See Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §124 Remark: 'The right of the subject's particularit y to nd satisfaction , or . . . the right of subjectiv e freedom , is the pivotal and focal point in the differenc e between antiquity and modernity. ' Also §273 Addition (Hotho and Gans) 'The principle of the modern world in general is freedom of subjectivity , accordin g to which all essential aspects present in the social totality develop and enter into their right' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Habermas makes the same point in terms of developmenta l psychology . Modern subjects develop post-conventiona l cognitive competencies and form abstract ego identities : that is, they are capable of acting on the basis of self-chose n principles rather than traditional values or external authority , and their sense of self is uncouple d from traditional roles, practices , and values, etc., of a particula r form of life (CES, pp. 69-95, TCA2, pp. 92-107, PNK, pp. 221-31). 8 TCA1 157-215. 9 In this Habermas sides with Talcott Parsons against Weber's theory of rationalizatio n (TCA2, pp. 283-99). 10 Here Habermas argues as a neo-Weberian along with Horkheimer, Adorno, and the later Marcuse contra Parsons. 11 It is because Habermas sees the advent of modernity as an opportunit y for achievin g social stability and legitimacy, whilst widening the scope for individua l autonomy, that he resists the trend of some postmodernis t writers to say good-bye and good-riddanc e to the project of modernity and its opportunities . See for example his 1980 Adorno Prize lecture 'Modernity -an Un nished Project' (DMUP, pp. . This refusal to throw the baby out with the bathwater of modernization lies at the heart of his polemic against some forms postmodernis m inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegger in (PDM). 12 Habermas now claims that this task falls both to moral and to ethical discourses. However, in the early 1980s he did not make this distinction and tended to treat practical and moral discourse as equivalent .
13 'Even if those who conceive d themselves as "moderns" always invented an idealized past to imitate, none the less this modernity now consciou s of itself has to justify this choice of model with its own standard s and to create everythin g normative out of itself. Modernity has to stabilize itself on the basis of the only authority that it has left standing , namely on the basis of reason' (PNK, p. 198). See also (PNK, p. 196) on modern Romanticism. 14 See also CES, pp. 69-95 and PMT, pp. 149-205. 15 'Denn der Diskurs kann, dank seiner normativ gehaltvolle n Kommunikationsvoraussetzungen, jene Beschränkungen , die der Rechtfertigungspraxi s mit dem Entwurf eines moralische n Universum s auferlegt werden, aus sich selbst heraus erzeugen.' 16 More recently he formulates premise (1) as 'the implicit content of the universal precondition s of argumentation ' (OCCM, p. 355/DEA, p. 61). 17 Habermas also claims that premise (2) consists in the participants ' knowledge of 'what it means to discuss hypotheticall y whether norms of action should be adopted' (MCCA, pp. 92 and 198). 18 Otherwise we could derive (U) like this: (a & a)® (U). 19 I am using 'true' here in the very broad sense of whatever designate d epistemic value is passed from premises to conclusio n by valid inference. 20 See note 19. 21 Note that it is a common mistake to think that the whole argument can be given (and thus that the conclusio n -the 'truth' of principle (U) -can be established by) a transcendentalpragmatic justi cation. This is not and never was Habermas's position. . . can then be understood in analogy with the truth of assertori c sentences.' 25 Habermas treats this claim as equivalen t to the following: For any normative utterance q: if q is right, then q is amenable to rationall y motivated consensus. 26 'Discourse ethics, then, stands or falls with two assumptions: (a) that normative claims to validity have cognitive meaning and can be treated like claims to truth and (b) that the justi cation of norms and commands requires that a real discourse be carried out and thus cannot occur in a strictly monologica l form . . .' (MCCA, p. 68). 27 Most surprisingly , in his most recent essay, Habermas abandon s his long-hel d view that truth is epistemic and concede s that truth, unlike normative rightness , is a justi cationtranscenden t concept. "'Truth' is a justi cation-transcenden t concept which cannot even be captured with the concept of ideally justi ed assertability . It points rather to truth conditions, which to a certain extent have to be ful lled by reality itself. By contrast, the meaning of 'rightness' [Richtigkeit , i.e., correctness G.F.] can be reduced to ideally justi ed acceptabilit y (RW, p. 188). As a consequenc e he must give up the claim that truth and rightness are speci cations of a single generic conceptio n of validity. For once we allow that truth -call it Truth -outstrips justi cation, we allow the possibilit y that there are unjusti able Truths. But why should we expect anyone in discourse to accept such a Truth? Conversely , there may be justi able Falsehoods which everyone has reason to accept. Hence there can be no necessar y connectio n between Truths and the amenability to rationall y motivated consensus. In this way Habermas's recent abandonment of an epistemic (or justi cation-immanent ) concept of truth in favour of a much richer, nonepistemic, or justi cation-transcenden t concept derails the analogy between truth and rightness in respect of their pragmatic connection s with consensus , and blocks the claim that truth and rightness are speci cations of a single underlying conception of validity." 28 The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958 
